Символизм?

Конечно есть, всё это мудры shemeacov.narod.ru/mudra/mudra.htm

Bhaktivedanta VedaBase: Srimad Bhagavatam 10.87.1: Srila Sridhara Svami elaborately analyzes this problem in terms of the traditional discipline of Sanskrit poetics: We should consider that words have three kinds of expressive capacities, called sabda-vrittis. These are the different ways a word refers to its meaning, distinguished as mukhya-vritti, lakshana-vritti and gauna-vritti. The sabda-vritti termed mukhya is the primary, literal meaning of a word; this is also known as abhidha, a word's "denotation," or dictionary meaning. Mukhya-vritti is further divided into two subcategories, namely rudhi and yoga. A primary meaning is called rudhi when it is based on conventional usage, and yoga when it is derived from another word's meaning by regular etymological rules.

For example, the word go ("cow") is an example of rudhi, since its relation with its literal meaning is purely conventional. The denotation of the word pacaka ("chef"), on the other hand, is a yoga-vritti, through the word's derivation from the root pac ("to cook") by addition of the agent suffix -ka.

Beside its mukhya-vritti, or primary meaning, a word can also be used in a secondary, metaphorical sense. This usage is called lakshana. The rule is that a word should not be understood metaphorically if its mukhya-vritti makes sense in the given context; only after the mukhya-vritti fails to convey a word's meaning may lakshana-vritti be justifiably presumed. The function of lakshana is technically explained in the kavya-sastras as an extended reference, pointing to something in some way related to the object of the literal meaning. Thus, the phrase gangayam ghoshah literally means "the cowherd village in the Ganges." But that idea is absurd, so here gangayam should rather be understood by its lakshana to mean "on the bank of the Ganges," the bank being something related to the river. Gauna-vritti is a special kind of lakshana, where the meaning is extended to some idea of similarity. For example, in the statement simho devadattah ("Devadatta is a lion"), heroic Devadatta is metaphorically called a lion because of his lionlike qualities. In contrast, the example of the general kind of lakshana, namely gangayam ghoshah, involves a relationship not of similarity but of location.

In this first verse of the Eighty-seventh Chapter, Parikshit Maharaja expresses doubt as to how the words of the Vedas can refer to the Absolute Truth by any of the valid kinds of sabda-vritti. He asks, katham sakshat caranti: How can the Vedas directly describe Brahman by rudha-mukhya-vritti, literal meaning based on convention? After all, the Absolute is anirdesya, inaccessible to designation. And how can the Vedas even describe Brahman by gauna-vritti, metaphor based on similar qualities?

The Vedas are guna-vrittayah, full of qualitative descriptions, but Brahman is nirguna, without qualities. Obviously, a metaphor based on similar qualities cannot apply in the case of something that has no qualities. Furthermore, Parikshit Maharaja points out that Brahman is sad-asatah param, beyond all causes and effects. Having no connection with any manifest existence, subtle or gross, the Absolute cannot be expressed by either yoga-vritti, a meaning derived etymologically, or lakshana, metaphor, since both require some relationship of Brahman to other entities.

Thus King Parikshit is puzzled as to how the words of the Vedas can directly describe the Absolute Truth.

Прабху Джи Админ Дерекор, релятивизм на который вы указуете не приемлем для вайшнав, у нас есть истина Абсолютная в которой разрешаются все относительные, это ж и есть излюбленнная вами недвойственнность! Я выше указал на то что метафоры вед некая стабильная непреложная реальность. Вот например когда в Рамаяне говорится, что Рама как лев серди зверей, это не значит же, что рама стал котом, а то что он Царь? Принцип мукхья вритти слишком превратно и буквально толкуется, вот что говорит Прабхупад(или его ученики):

Ой какая важная тема для гаудия вайшнав!